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Abstract 
Enterprise roles dejine the duties and responsibilities 
of the individuals which are assigned to them This paper 
introduces a framework for the management of large 
distributed systems which makes use of the concepts 
developed in role theory. Our concept of a role groups the 
specifications of management policies which define the 
rights and duties corresponding to that role. Individuals 
m y  then be assigned to or withdrawn from a role, to 
enable rapid and flexible organisational change, without 
altering the Specification of the policies. We extend this 
role concept to include relationships as means of 
specifying required interactions, duties and rights 
between related roles. Organisations may contain large 
numbers of similar roles with multiple relationships 
between them, so there is a need for  reuse of 
specifications. Role and relationship classes permit 
multiple instantiation and inheritance is used for 
incremental extension of the organisational structure with 
minimal specification effort. We also briefly examine 
consistency and auditing issues related to this role 
framework. 
1. Introduction 
Many organisations have handbooks of policies and 
procedures relating to security or specifications of duties 
related to positions in the organisation (job descriptions). 
These policies are usually specified in natural language in 
terms of groups of employees and organisational roles 
rather than individuals but are not analysable or directly 
implementable. We have developed a role framework 
which can be used to “formally” specify Enterprise 
viewpoint role concepts, analyse these specifications for 
consistency and translate them into automated agents for 
managing distributed systems. We have used the concepts 
developed in [ 1],[2] in order to group the specifications of 
the rights and duties in the organisational structure into 
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roles. We model rights as authorisation policies which 
specify what activities a subject* is permitted (or 
forbidden) to perform on a set of target objects. Duties are 
modelled as obligation policies which specify what 
activities a subject must or must not perform on a set of 
target objects. Users may be assigned to or withdrawn 
from a role, to enable rapid and flexible organisational 
change, without changing the policies. We also consider 
the relationships between multiple roles to define the 
rights, duties and protocols pertaining to interactions 
between roles (e.g. right for a manager to assign a task to 
an assistant, or a protocol by which a general practitioner 
refers a patient to a specialist). Roles and relationships are 
seen as the building blocks of the organisational structure. 
An organisation will have many similar roles, for example 
a hospital will have several doctors each with their own 
specific patients. Role and relationship classes are 
therefore defined in order to permit multiple instances to 
be created from a single specification. This requires the 
definition of policy templates which have to be 
instantiated with specific targets for every role instance. 
There is also a need for derivation of specialised roles 
such as a surgeon from more generic ones such as a 
doctor, which can be supported by class inheritance. 
Multiple policies apply to objects in the system so it 
is necessary to analyse the policies to detect and resolve 
conflicts such as a role with a duty to perform an action 
which is forbidden, or to detect violations of constraints 
expressed as meta-policies. We briefly examine the 
conflicts which can occur between management policies, 
but further information on conflict detection and 
resolution is given in [3]. We also specify concurrency 
constraints relating to ordering of activities regarding role 
interactions. 
We use the term “subject” to refer to an object representing a user, 
human manager or an automated agent which can initiate activities 
within the system 
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There is a growing interest for formalising and 
automating the clinical process model [4],[5] which has a 
high degree of inter-personnel collaboration and 
standardised procedures. Thus, most of the examples used 
in this paper relate to the responsibilities and interactions 
in the health care process. 
Section 2 introduces the concepts of dlomains, 
policies and Meta-policies. In Section 3 we define the 
roles and relationships. Policy templates, roles and 
relationship classes are then discussed in Sectioin 4 and 
consistency issues are presented in Section 5. 
2. Management services and policies 
2.1 Domains 
Large distributed systems may contain milllions of 
objects so it is impractical to specify policies for 
individual objects. Objects are therefore grouped in 
domains to specify a common management policy or to 
structure and partition management responsibility. A 
domain is a collection of objects (actually references to 
object interfaces) which have been explicitly grouped 
together for the purposes of management (cf, file system 
directories or folders). A domain is an object, so may also 
be a member of another domain. A domain service is 
provided for the manipulation of the membership 
information. Further, domain scope expressions can be 
specified determining the set of objects to which a policy 
applies. For example @Di-@D2-03 represents the 
objects that are members of D1 with members of D2 and 
object 0 3  excluded. Our concept of a domain is very 
similar to that of a directory in a typical hierarchjcal file 
system. The policy which applies to a domain will, by 
default, propagate to sub-domains and to the objects 
within them, although this propagation can option,ally be 
disabled. A User Representation Domain (URD) is a 
persistent representation of the human within the 
computing system. When a person logs in, an (adapter 
object (cf. login shell) is created within the URD to act as 
the interface process between the person and the computer 
system. Other agents representing the human could also 
be created in the URD. Details on the domain structure 
and the relevant services can be found in [6],[71. 
without interrupting their functioning. A policy 
establishes a relationship, between manager and managed 
object domains, which can be either an Obligation 
specifying what actions subjects must or must not perform 
on target objects or an Authorisation specifying what 
actions subjects are authorised or forbidden to invoke on 
target objects. The general format of the policies is given 
below with optional arguments within brackets: 
identifier mode [trigger] subject '(' action I } '  target 
[constraint] [exception] [parent] [child] [xref] I;' 
The mode of the policy distinguishes between 
positive authorisation (permitted: A+), negative 
authorisation (forbidden: A-), positive obligation (must: 
0+) and negative obligation (must not: 0-). The subject 
represents the set of managers assigned to carry out the 
actions on the set of target objects. Both sets are specified 
using domain scope expressions. Positive obligation 
policies can be triggered by time or by composite events 
detected within the monitoring system [8]. Constraints 
limit the applicability of the policy e.g. between the hours 
of 09.00 and 17.00. The policy format and use is further 
described in [9]. Examples of policies are: 
/* every day nurses are obliged to generate a status log of 
the drugs used */ 
O+ every [l *day] n:@/nurses { generate-log(n) } 
/* nurses are not authorised to validate discharges */ 
A- @/nurses { validate } Wpatientsldischarges; 
Policies can specify actions at different levels of 
abstraction. A refinement hierarchy can therefore be built 
from the more abstract policies, which can only be 
interpreted by humans, to the enactable leaf level policies 
or rules which can be interpreted by automated 
components. Tools for policy editing and services have 
been implemented and are described in [91,[101. 
Authorisation policies are translated into access control 
lists which are interpreted by security agents in the target 
system [ 1 11 and obligation policies are disseminated to 





Management policies are used in order to separate the 
specification of the behaviour fiom the software 
components of the system. They can be dynarnically 
distributed or retracted from the managers, thus changing 
the behaviour and strategy of the management .system 
Several policies may apply to the same objects either 
to reflect different management functionalities 
(configuration, performance, monitoring) or because 
objects may be members of several domains. Conflicts 
may then arise between the various policies. We 
distinguish between modality conflicts which arise from 
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inconsistent modes of the policies, e.g. O+ and 0-, and 
application-specific conflicts such as separation of duties 
or conflicts for resources [12],[3]. It is necessary to 
specify constraints pertaining to the attributes of policies 
in order to avoid application-specific conflicts. We term 
these constraints meta-policies (policies about permitted 
policies). They can be expressed as logical predicates 
applying to sets of policy objects within a domain. For 
example a conflict of duties stating that the same manager 
cannot both authorise payment and sign the payment 
cheque can be written as: 
VPl,F’2 E <  domain-scope-exp > 
fail t intersect(P1 subjects, P2.subjects) A 
belongs(’payment’, intersect(F‘1 .targets, P2.targets)) A 
belongs(’authorise’,P1 .actions) A belongs(’sign’, P2.actions) 
Meta-policies, constraining the permitted policies, 
can be included in a role or a relationship. Other 
constraints, within a policy expression, limit the 
applicability of the policy e.g. to a particular time interval, 
but are different from the meta-policies which express 
constraints of compatibility between policies. 
In the following sections we describe the roles, 
relationships and associated classes. Consistency 
problems and modality conflicts will be examined in 
Section 5 .  
3. Roles and Relationships 
The organisational structure can be represented as 
inter-related roles. For example a hospital may contain 
administrative staff, registrars, surgeons, pharmacists, etc. 
who co-operate in order to provide care to a patient. We 
initially define a role as a group of policies, specifying its 
obligations and authorisations and a relationship as a 
group of interacting roles. Relationships also contain the 
policies which specify the duties and authorisations of a 
role with regards to the other roles e.g. right to assign a 
task, obligation to provide some information. These 
policies are considered part of the relationship rather than 
the individual roles, because their lifetime is dependent on 
the lifetime of the relationship. We first examine the role 
as a group of policies then we will show how the role can 
be extended with constraints and relationships which 
specify the role interactions. 
3.1 Roles as groups of policies 
A role groups the policies specifying the duties and 
rights of a particular position inside the organisation. 
These policies reference a common subject domain called 
the Manager Position Domain (MPD). A user is 
assigned to a role by authorising the user to connect to a 
proxy object in the MPD which inherits all the rights 
pertaining to the role and acts as the user’s representative 
in that role (Figure 1). The user interacts with the system 
via an adapter object in the URD which is similar to an X 
server in that it provides a separate window for each role. 
The authorisation policies of the role indicate the 
permitted actions and can be used to customise the menus 
or choice of commands presented to the user in the 
window. This permits a clear separation of activity 
context for each role to which a user is assigned, and 
makes sure a user does not use the rights pertaining to one 
role to perform operations within another role. By 
analysing the policies referencing the URD it is possible 
to determine to which roles the user has been assigned. 
The main advantage of specifying policies in terms of 
roles rather than individuals is that organisational 
changes, when individuals are assigned to new roles, does 
not require any changes to the policy specification 
relating to the roles. Individual users can still have other 
policies relating to their URD which have nothing to do 
with their role, for example private policies permitting 
access to personal files or global policies about choosing 
passwords relating to all members of the organisation. 
A Role A 
J 
Manager Pmihon 
Domain for Role B 
Figure 1 Management roles 
The implementation of a role is an object which 
maintains a reference to the MPD of the role and a table 
of all the policies which are part of the role. Each entry in 
this table is composed of a name, unique within the role, 
and a reference to the policy object which can be resolved 
by the underlying support system (Figure 2). Note that 
domains, policies, roles and relationships are objects of 
the system and therefore can be target objects for other 
management policies. The management of tasks and of 
the organisational structure can therefore be specified in 
terms of the policies and roles themselves. However, the 
model described so far is incomplete since it does not 
cater for relationships between roles and does not provide 
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any means of specifying consistency or synchronisation 
constraints relating to the activities of the roles. 
3.2 Extended Roles 
Obligation policies may synchronise only on the 
events which trigger them. This is a low-level mechanism 
which requires an administrator specifying policies and 
roles, to know which events will be generated by the 
system. Although the monitoring system may allow the 
use of compound events [8] a notation suitable for 
expressing concurrency constraints is required. 
Definition 1 A concurrency constraint is an 
expression determined by the following EBNF 
specification: 
expr ::= expr operator expr I ‘(‘ expr I}’ 
I on (condition) expr 
I po1icy:action P in a role ora relationship’/ 
I ro1e:policy:action P in a relationship Y 
operator ::= 
I;’ /* sequential: a1 ; a2 - a2 must follow a1 */ 
I ‘& /* and: a1 & a2 - a1 and a2 can be performed in 
parallel and both must complete */ 
I ‘I’ /* or: a1 I a2 - perform a1 or a2 */ 
I I#’ P conflict: a1 # a2 - a i  and a2 cannot overlap */ 
I ‘11’ /* parallel: a1 I I  a2 - a1 and a2 may be 
performed in parallel. Completion of any will 
continue the execution */ 
Role and policy denote names local to the role or to the 
relationship. 
This notation allows us to express sequences of 
actions, parallelism and synchronisation in concurrency 
constraint rules which apply to the policies of a role or of 
a relationship. For example a physician must first assess 
the condition of a patient then order a blood test imd an 
antibiotics allergy test. Both must be completed before 
any antibiotics are prescribed. This can be written in the 
physician’s role as: 
p l  :assess-condition ; (p2:blood-test & p3:allergy-test) ; 
p4:prescribe-antibiotics 
Inside a role a policy is referred to by its unique name 
local to the role e.g. pl, p2, p3 so as to be able to chimge a 
policy in the role without needing to edit the constraints. 
Concurrency constraints can be translated to coimplex 
events [8] which will trigger the execution of activities 
[13]. This allows us to combine several concuirency 
constraints in a complex event graph and perform 
causality analysis on the graph e.g. detection of cyclles. A 
role object maintains a concurrency constraint table >where 
each entry contains a name unique within the table and a 
constraint expression. 
In addition to concurrency constraints Meta-Policies 
may constrain the group of policies which comprise a 
role, e.g. the maximum number of patients that one nurse 
can look after is limited to 10. Furthermore a role refers to 
the relationships of which it is part and which contain the 
policies having other related roles as target. We therefore 
define a role as follows: 
Definition 2 A role (r) is defined by the MPD and the 
sets of: policies <p> specifying the obligations and 
authorisations associated with the position, relationships 
del> in which the role is involved and constraints 
(concurrency constraints <c> and meta-policies <mp>). 
r = <mpd,<p>, <rei>, <c>, <mpz> where each element in 
the sets is designated by a name local to the role (see 
Figure 2). 
For example, the role of a physician in a hospital may 
contain the obligations towards his patients, 
authorisations regarding the use and prescription of drugs 
and his relationships with the nurses, radiologists and 
administrative staff of the hospital. Note that any policy 
belonging to a role has the MPD as subject. In the 
remainder of the paper we will therefore omit the subject 
of a policy in a role or represent it by the keyword MPD. 
A role contains references to the relationships it is part of. 
The set Gel> must therefore correspond to the set of all 
the relationships in the system which contain the role ‘r’. 
I I 4 Dunahpath 
I I I  1 l 
I 
metapoliaes 0 I 
name expression 
Figure 2 Role Implementation 
In the following sections we examine how roles 
relate to each other and how interaction protocols may be 
defined. 
3.3 Relationships 
Relationships between roles define the policies 
regarding the related roles, e.g. right to assign a task to a 
role and policies regarding the use of shared resources. 
However, this is not sufficient since managers interact 
and cc-operate with each other in order to perform their 
tasks. Relationships must therefore specify the protocols 
for the required interactions between various roles. For 
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Example1 Doctor - specialist interaction protocol 
(3) *.req-data * [data, ....I -+ specialist 
[results, res] -+ doctor or 
[req-data, data requested] -+ doctor 
(4) request.*.data + [results, res] -+ doctor 
example, referring a patient to a specialist must be done 
according to a pre-established protocol which ensures 
availability of data and leaves no ambiguity as to whether 
the patient will be consulted or not by the specialist. 
Interaction protocols are specified by a set of rules 
triggered by pattern matching on the type-chain of the 
incoming messages. 
Definition 3 An interaction protocol is a set of rules 
defined according to the following specification: 
rule ::= 
role regular-expression :: guard a action-rule 
action-rule ::= action I ( action } I action ‘or‘ action 
I action ‘,’ action 
action ::= object-invocation 
I generate-event(event) 
I message ‘-+I role 
message ::= [type-chain, data] 
where role denotes a name local to the relationship. 
Each rule of the protocol is associated with a ‘role’ of 
the relationship. Each exchanged message must have a 
type belonging to a finite Universe of Discourse [14] 
defined for each interaction protocol. An incoming 
message triggers one or several of the rules associated 
with the destination role by matching the regular 
expressions against the type-chain contained in the 
incoming message. The type-chain is the sequence of the 
types of all exchanged messages in the current interaction 
e.g. request.deny denotes a denial made in response to a 
request. The guard is a predicate on the contents of the 
message which must be satisfied before the rule is 
triggered. The rule indicates a sequence of actions to be 
performed, reply to be sent or events to be generated. 
When a human manager is assigned to a role it is 
necessary to allow the manager some freedom of choice 
in the course of actions to be taken while still constraining 
him to remain within the framework of the specified 
protocol. The human manager can then select between the 
various matched rules (if several) or choose between the 
alternatives offered by the use of ‘or’ in the rules. In the 
case where automated managers are assigned to a role 
determinism can be obtained by preventing the use of ‘or’ 
in the specification of the rules and defining a simple 
heuristics for matching the rules e.g. first rule matched. 
For example the protocol for referring a patient for 
examination to a specialist may be specified in our 
notation as shown in Example 1. 
Rule (2) allows the specialist to choose between 
various options: refuse to examine the patient, examine 
and return results, or request further data. In this last case 
the protocol prevents the specialist from responding by 
anything but a result if additional data has been requested. 
The request for additional data therefore implies that the 
specialist has accepted the patient for examination (4). 
The rule matching the incoming request (3) may also be 
extended to generate an event which can trigger a policy 
and automatically retrieve some of the information 
regarding the patient from the database. Each time a new 
message is sent the type of the message is appended to the 
type-chain contained in the received message. This 
enables us to specify regular expressions which take into 
account the past stages of the interaction. For example 
request.{req_data.data)3 matches the case where three 
request-data.data sequences have already occurred. A 
new rule may in this case allow the doctor to terminate 
the interaction. 
Under the assumption of a finite Universe of 
Discourse and by using production rules, it is possible to 
build a commitment calculus which permits assertions to 
be made about the state of the system and determines the 
commitments of the participants in the interaction from 
the messages exchanged. A large amount of work exists 
in this area based on the Speech Acts theory [15]. It is not 
our intention to produce yet another normative speech 
system, but it is worth pointing out that such a facility can 
be built for the purposes of office automation using the 
given interaction rules. 
Both the interaction protocol rules and the policies 
pertain to a role i.e. they are associated with a role within 
the relationship. Relationships may be constrained in the 
same way as roles by concurrency constraints and meta- 
policies for which they define a scope of validity. 
Definition 4 A relationship (rel) is defined by the set of 
roles <e, policies <p>, interaction protocols cip> and 
constraints (cc> and cmp>) defining the behaviour of the 
related parties. re1 = ccp, cp>, tip>, cc>, cmp>> where 
each element in the set is designated by a name local to 
the relationship. 
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Several types of relationships can be defined in this 
way. Supervision of work can be specified by obligations 
to provide reports, checks on completed tasks and 
protocols for requesting authorisations. Contractual 
relationships are defined by the obligations of each of the 
contractual parties, authorisations regarding the use of 
shared resources and interaction protocols for negotiation 
and exchange of documents. A wide range of 
relationships can therefore be modelled giving a more 
accurate and flexible representation of the organisational 
structure. In particular, organisations with decentralised 
management can be modelled in addition to the 
centralised hierarchical structure. When a role: of the 
relationship (a> set) is a target of one of the policies (e.g. 
assignment of a task), the role is designated by its unique 
name local to the relationship e.g. doctor, specialist. This 
indirection is necessary in order to be able to replace a 
role in the relationship without changing the policies or 
other components of the relationship. Figure 3 
summarises the components of our Role framework. 
For Each Relationshlp 
lbjects 
1 
Figure 3 Related Role 
4. Classes and Templates 
An organisation may contain large numbers of roles 
with few differences between them. Furthermore, each 
role may be part of a large number of relationships. We 
introduce classes and templates in order to reduce the 
number and complexity of the specifications. For example 
a nurse role class can be specified and used to create the 
nurse-instance roles for wards 3,4 and 10. Each instance 
may then be customised for any particular task relating to 
a specific ward and a specific person assigned to each 
role. In this section we define the role object model and 
examine its uses. The definition of role classes is based 
upon policy templates (which are specifications of duties 
and rights independent of subject, target or both). 
4.1 Policy Templates 
Policy templates are used in order to provide the 
reuse of the policy specifications according to their 
domain of application. 
Definition 5 A poky template uses variables to 
represent subjects and/or targets i.e. specifies the policy 
actions and constraints which can be reused for different 
subjects and targets. 
The instantiation of a policy object from a policy 
template is done by specifying the subjects and targets. 
For example in a hospital a policy template such as the 
one below may be specified (S and T represent variables). 
Note the use of the constraint to limit the applicability of 
the policy to particular object instances within the target 
domain T. 
/* subjects are authorised to administer analgesics when 
the temperature of the target is between 37 and 38.5 */ 
A+ S ( administer(ana1gesics) } x:T 
when (x.temp > 37) && (x.temp c 38.5) 
The following policy authorising a nurse to administer 
analgesics to lung-disease patients may then be created 
fiom the above template by assigning values to S and T. 
A+ @/personneVnurses ( administer(ana1gesic) } 
x: @/patients/lung-diseases 
when (x.temperature > 37) && (x.temperature e 38.5) 
A policy template may not inherit from another 
policy template since the components of a policy (actions, 
condition, trigger, etc.) are closely related and cannot be 
combined by inheritance. The policy will maintain a 
reference to the template from which it has been created 
in addition to the references maintained to the policies it 
has been refined from. When a policy template is 
instantiated from a role class, only the target has to be 
specified since the subject is determined by the MPD. 
Similarly, upon instantiation of a relationship the subject 
of a policy is the MPD of the role it is associated with. 
4.2 Defining Role Classes 
A role class groups specifications of the policy 
templates for the duties and rights of a generic role in the 
organisation e.g. nurse, engineer, marketing manager. 
When a role instance is created, a MPD for the role is 
then created so a manager cannot be assigned to a role 
class, only to a role instance. The role class contains only 
policy templates, not instances. Consider the example of 
the nurse role class, containing a set of policy templates 
which may have some undefined targets. The nurse class 
may contain the following templates: 
41 
Authorized licensed use limited to: Imperial College London. Downloaded on July 12,2010 at 13:10:17 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
/* the nurse is authorised to access the drugs database */ 
pt-7 A+ D { read(), search(), update() } 
@/software/databaseddrugs-db 
/* nurses must monitor their patients */ 
pt-2 O+ D { monitor() } P 
When the role is instantiated the MPD can be 
assigned to the variable D of template pt-1 which is then 
fully specified as the same target domain is used for all 
nurse instances. However pt-2 also needs a target domain 
representing the specific patients for which the nurse 
instance is responsible, to be assigned to variable P. Note 
that instead of specifying the pt-1 policy template, a 
global policy instance (which is not part of the role) with 
a subject referencing a domain containing all instances of 
the nurse role could have been specified. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that the system must be 
conskained to include every nurse role in a given domain 
which is very difficult to implement and to check. If 
multiple instances of a particular policy template are 
required in a role, then the role class must specify a 
different local name for each reference to the policy 
template. This situation is however unlikely to occur 
because, within the role, policies created from the same 
template differ only in their targets which can be 
composed into a single domain scope expression to define 
all the targets e.g. domain4  + domain-B - domain-C. 
The concurrency constraints defined in a role class will 
apply, without change, to all the instances of the class. 
This is because the concurrency constraint refers to 
policies by their local name in the role and only the 
targets of the policy change between the policy instance 
and the policy template. 
Concurrency constraints may also be specified for 
poIky templates and refer to policies by their local name 
within the roles or relationships. They reference only the 
activities within a policy, so they can apply to either 
policy objects or templates. Consider the following policy 
templates. 
/* the nurse must administer analgesics when the 
temperature of the target is  > 37 */ 
p t 3  O+ on x.temperature > 37 
D { administer(ana1gesics) 1 x:T 
/* the nurse must update the database when drugs have 
been administered */ 
pL4 O+ on administer-drugs D ( update } 
@/software/databases/drugs-db 
The following constraint ensures that the drugs 
database is updated after drugs have been administered. 
c- 7 pt-3:administer(analgesics) ; pt-4:update 
Finally a role class may reference relationship classes 
defined as described in the following section. The 
reference to a relationship class specifies that an instance 
of the role class cannot be created without the 
corresponding relationship being instantiated. For 
example a nurse role may not be created without creating 
a relationship with a head of ward role. Note that only 
required relationships must be specified. Additional 
relationships, for example with the physicians, may be 
added at a later stage. 
Definition 6 A role class (r') is defined by an MPD 
variable, a set of policy templates, a set of intra-role 
concurrency constraints, a set of meta policies and a set 
of relationship classes. r' = <MPD, <p'>, <c>, <mp>, 
<ret'>> where each element in the sets is designated by a 
local name. 
An instance of the role class can be created by 
creating the MPD, instantiating policy objects by 
specifying all undefined targets for each of the elements 
in the <p*> set, and assigning references to the 
relationships in the <rei*> set. Concurrency constraints 
apply to policies or policy templates. The meta-policies 
can be used to prevent policies which do not satisfy the 
meta-policy constraints from being created. 
4.3 Implementing inheritance 
Single inheritance implements a specialisation of 
role classes. For example a role class can be specified for 
a specialised nurse or a paediatric nurse which inherit 
from the nurse role class (Figure 4). New duties and rights 
can then be specified for the specialised nurse that do not 
apply for the nurse. Furthermore, a sub-class must be able 
to override or cancel policy templates of a super-class e.g. 
a specialised nurse may not have a duty to monitor all 
patients but deal only with specific cases (Figure 4 - 
policy pt-2). Inheritance can be implemented by 
maintaining a reference to the super-class object and new 
policy templates must have different names from those in 
the super-class. If a new policy template or constraint has 
the same name as one fYom the super-class, the inherited 
one will be overridden. Concurrency constraints are 
evaluated in the namespace of the sub-class so policy 
names will be replaced with the local reference overriding 
inherited ones. However, overriding policy templates may 
introduce inconsistencies if the new policy does not 
contain the actions referred to by the concurrency 
constraints. These inconsistencies may be detected by an 
automated process of the role editor but changes to the 
concurrency constraints will have to be done manually. 
Composing role classes by multiple inheritance may 
also be a desirable feature. For example a paediatric nurse 
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can inherit rights and duties from a nurse role class and a 
generic-childcare role class (see Figure 4). However, 
multiple inheritance introduces the problems arising from 
multiple super-classes having policies with the same 
name. For example in Figure 4, both the nurse and the 
generic-childcare role classes define a policy template 
with the name pt-2. A standard solution is to unify the 
name spaces in the subclass and assign a precedence order 
to the super-classes e.g. the textual order in the class 
inheritance list. It is then possible to override the unified 
policy names with new ones defined in the subclass, as 
for single inheritance. We intend to implement multiple 
inheritance by combining the specifications of' the super- 
classes rather then having policies with the same name 
ovemde each other. In this case the name spaces of the 
super-classes are kept disjoint. Referring to an inherited 
policy template, whether to override it or within a new 
concurrency constraint must then be done by prefixing the 
name of that template with the name of the super-class 
from which it was inherited e.g. nurse.pt-2 (Figure 4). 
Inherited concurrency constraints have to be evaluated 
within the context of the class from which they have been 
inherited plus all overridden policy templates. 
Figure 4 
Super-classes also maintain references to the sub- 
classes which inherit from them and classes mlaintain 
references to the objects which have been instantiated 
from them. ?his permits us to define skills [Ifi]. Skills 
may be associated with roles outlining their basic 
capabilities. A trader service may then be used to locate 
roles which have specific skills. It is thus possible for the 
trader to browse the inheritance graph and d e t d m e  the 
roles which have for example, the skills of a nurse. The 
definition and implementation of skills requires however 
further study. 
A class may not be changed once subclasses or 
instances have been created from it. We may in the hture 
Role class inheritance graph 
relax this constraint and propagate changes to subclasses 
and to instances. This is possibie L xause references to 
subclasses are maintained as mentioned above. 
4.4 Relationship Classes 
A relationship class has a set of elements each of a 
given role class and a possibly empty set of roles e.g. the 
relationship class with a unique head of personnel role. A 
relationship class may therefore contain the policy objects 
pertaining to the roles and a set of policy templates 
pertaining to the role classes. 
Definition 7 A relationship class @el*) is defined by a 
(possibly empty) set of roles <e, a set of role classes 
<r*>, a set of interaction protocol rules <ipz, and a set of 
constraints (concurrency ac> and meta-policies <mp>). 
The relationship class also contains a set of policies <p> 
(each one of them being associated with a role) and a set 
of policy templates <p*> (each one of them being 
associated with a role class). Interaction protocol rules 
may be associated with either a role or a role class. 
rel* = C<D, cr'>, <p>, <p*>, <c>, <mp>, <ip>> 
Every instance of a relationship class containing role 
instances will be a new relationship with those role 
instances. Within a relationship class the concurrency 
constraints may refer to items in either the <p> or the 
<p*> set. A relationship class can be instantiated by 
assigning each of the references in the sets <p*> and 
a*>. The named elements of the a*> set act as place 
holders i.e. upon instantiation of the relationship class a 
role instance must be assigned to that name. Further the 
role instance must be an instance of the class which is 
associated with the name in the relationship class. 
Consider for example a relationship class between a 
nurse role class, a physician role class and a head of ward 
role (Example 2). The relationship contains the policy 
templates obligating the nurse to report every day to head 
of ward (npl). The physician has the obligation of 
specifying treatments for the patients (ppl) and the head 
of ward is responsible for assigning duties to the nurse, 
scheduling the activities and ordering the necessary drugs 
(hpl, hp2, hp3). Furthermore, an interaction protocol is 
provided which enables the doctor to request that a 
special treatment be performed (ipl). The request has to 
be sent to the head of ward which can decide to reject it or 
to assign a nurse (ip2). The reply must then be sent to 
both the nurse and the physician. The nurse must notify 
both the physician and the head of ward (ip3) when the 
treatment has been completed. c-l constrains the head of 
ward to assign duties only after the care treatment has 
been specified by the physician, a schedule has been 
elaborated and drugs have been ordered. 
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Example 2 Relationship class 




ppl: O+{specify-care } patients hpl: O+ {assign-duties} R1 
hp2: O+ { generate-schedule-of-activities } 
1 1 hp3: O+ {order-drugs ) pharmacy 
ip3: *.appoint => 1 ipl: [request, ...I + R3 ip2: request => [reject, ...I + R2 
or [assign. ... 1 -+ R1. R2 [confirm. ... 1 +  R2. R3 I >  . a~ 1 , -  I I 
Concurrency constraints 
c-1: R2:pl:specify-care ; { R3:~2:generate_schedule & R3:p3:order_drugs ] ; R3:pl:assign-duties 
Single inheritance and overloading occur for the 
relationship classes in much the same way as for the role 
classes. For example the relationship between a surgical 
nurse and a surgeon may inherit from the relationship 
between a nurse and a doctor and add special interaction 
protocols for urgent interventions (Figure 5). 
Overloading of a role or a role class in a relationship 
is restricted to one of the subclasses of the roles in the 
relationship super-class. For example relationship2 could 
have been between a surgeon and a specialised nurse but 
not between a surgeon and a nurse or any other role class 
which is not a subclass of a specialised nurse. In this 
respect the role class hierarchy implements a typdsub- 
type mechanism for the relationship classes. Multiple 
inheritance is not allowed because a direct combination of 
two relationships by inheritance is undefined. 
I wg.on 
lluu 
n(nion.hlp 2 - 
Figure 5 Role and relationship inheritance 
5. Consistency 
Consistency of the role framework is ensured by 
various checks on the role and relationship specifications. 
The role editor will therefore use a set of tools for 
analysing and detecting conflicts or inconsistencies in the 
specification. We have already implemented a tool for 
off-line detection of modality conflicts which uses the 
principle of domain nesting [17] for giving precedence to 
some policies and automatically resolving some conflicts. 
Modality conflicts are inconsistencies in the policy 
specification which may arise when two or more policies 
with modalities of opposite sign refer to the same 
subjects, actions and targets. This occurs when there is a 
triple overlap between the sets of subjects, targets and 
actions, and so can be determined by syntactic analysis of 
polices. There are three types of modality conflicts: 
O+/O- the subjects are both required and required not 
to perform the same actions on the target objects. 
A+/A- the subjects are both authorised and forbidden 
to perform the actions on the target objects. 
O+/A- the subjects are required but forbidden to 
perform the actions on the target objects (obligation 
does not imply authorisation in our case). 
Obligations in our model do not imply authorisation 
and we assume a negative default policy i.e. everything is 
forbidden. In this way any action present in an obligation 
policy and not specifically authorised by an authorisation 
policy will be detected as a conflict. 
A second type of conflict refers to the consistency 
between what is contained in the policies i.e. which 
subjects, targets and actions are involved and extemal 
criteria such as limited resources or the overall policies of 
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the organisation. An example of this type of conflict 
arises from the principle of separation of duties [ 181 e.g. 
the same manager cannot authorise payments and sign the 
payment cheques. These conflicts are application- 
specific and must be specified using meta-policies. 
Several types of application-specific conflicts such as 
conflict of priorities for resources, conflict of duties, 
conflict of interests, multiple managers conflict and self- 
management conflict have been identified in [12] and 
classified according to the overlaps between the subject, 
action and target sets. Further details on the conflict 
analysis for management policies are given in [ 3 ] .  We 
have been experimenting with meta-policies written in 
Prolog but will have to define a notation more specific to 
the policies. 
Concurrency constraints may also exhibit 
inconsistencies; for example defining a cyclic 
interdependency between the activities. These may be 
detected by analysing the event graph which can be 
generated from the Constraints. Any presence of  cycles in 
the graph will reveal an inconsistency. 
Interaction protocols may suffer from incompleteness 
rather than inconsistency. Their specification by rules 
may lead to confusion regarding ‘who sends which 
message’ or ‘is there a rule triggered by ithe sent 
message’. Because we assume a finite Universe of 
Discourse it is possible to initially specify a protocol by a 
state transition network [19]. The initial set of rules can 
then be deduced by considering the regular expressions 
which match the various states 1131. By providing a 
graphical interface to the state transition network 
specification is made easier and completeness problems 
can be avoided. 
correspond to positions in the organisation but are merely 
used to define common pemi! >ions which can be 
inherited. RBAC2 introduces constraints on the role 
structure which bear some similarity to our meta-policies. 
Finally RBAC3 combines the features of the previous 
three models. This work deals only with access rights and 
not duties which somewhat simplifies the problem. 
Permissions always associate actions with target objects 
so they cannot define policy templates. This causes 
difficulties instantiating multiple role instances referring 
to different target objects. 
Singh and Rein describe a role structure based on 
activities and interactions [21],[22],[23],[243. They define 
the role in terms of available methods and relationships to 
‘partner‘ objects. Moreover, they identify a set of 
conflicting objects, temporal ordering constraints and 
constraints on the activities for each role. The interactions 
between roles are based on Petri-Net modelling although 
a higher-level graphical notation is defined. The model 
has a sound operational semantics based on PetriNets but 
does not take into account access control issues and does 
not provide any means for inheritance or reuse of the 
specification. 
Skarrneas defines roles for multi-agent systems [16]. 
An elementary role is defined as a collection of complex 
tasks and a hierarchy of roles is introduced which reflects 
the organisational task decomposition. Roles relate to 
each other by contracts which may contain subroles and 
references to other contracts. This work uses roles as a 
structuring tool for tasks which are assumed to be hard- 
coded and available to the agent. It ignores problems 
related to constraints, inheritance or concurrency. 
7. Conclusions 
6. Related Work 
Sandhu et al. introduce four different models for Role 
Based Access Control (RBACO-3) [20]. In RBACD a role 
is a mapping between a set of users and a. set of 
permissions. A set of users and a set of permissions are 
thus associated under a named role e.g. all the nurses in 
the hospital have the role ‘nurse’ and the access rights 
associated with it. A user is allowed to combine several 
roles in a single session. RBACl introduces role 
hierarchies as a means of inheriting access righits kom 
one role to another. Senior roles inherit the access rights 
of more junior roles e.g. a physician inherits the access 
rights of a general health-care provider. This approach 
introduces undesired compXexities when some of the 
access rights must be kept private to a more junior role 
e.g. a radiologist cannot issue prescriptions and thus 
should not inherit this access right from a physician. This 
leads to the proliferation of ‘virtual’ roles which do not 
This paper has introduced policies, roles and 
relationships for specifying enterprise viewpoint concepts 
which can be implemented by computational objects thus 
permitting automation of management. Roles identify the 
duties and authorisations of the individuals which are 
assigned to them. It is possible to assign and withdraw 
managers from roles without changing the specification of 
the role thus enabling rapid and flexibIe organisational 
change. Auditing of the role specification can be achieved 
by analysing the policies, with their explicit subject and 
target domains, to determine the duties and permissions of 
an individual assigned to multiple roles or to determine 
who has responsibility for or access rights to an object. 
We have defined the specification of relationships 
between roles which include the protocols for required 
interactions. It is thus possible to model various types of 
relationships such as peer-to-peer, supervision and 
contractual arrangements. Roles and relationships can be 
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used to describe and analyse the organisational structure 
and to implement policies and procedures for enforcing 
security and ensuring quality. 
There are many roles and relationships in an 
organisation. Similar specifications can be grouped in 
classes permitting re-use of the specifications and 
incremental design. We have shown what information is 
needed to create role and policy instances from their 
classes. Our work has shown that relying only on instance 
inheritance is not practical. It is essential to be able to 
parameterise instances. We are currently implementing 
the role object model and the role and relationship editor 
using a COMA-based distributed programming 
environment. Although the current role editor offers the 
basic support needed for defining roles, relationships, 
policies and their associated classes it does not yet cater 
for the automatic detection of name clashes or checks for 
consistency of specifications. Also it does not yet offer 
transparent visualisation of inherited elements. 
A conflict detection tool for modality conflicts has 
been implemented and some work on the specification 
and validation of meta-policies has been done [ 3 ] .  Further 
work is needed along this line in particular for defining a 
meta-policy notation (we have used Prolog up to now). 
Although initial grammars of both concurrency 
constraints and interaction protocol rules have been 
specified, further work is in progress for the 
implementation of the role agents which interpret 
obligation policies. 
We intend to investigate the applicability of software 
engineering goal refinement tools and techniques for 
policy refinement and its bearing on the role object 
model. In particular the task decomposition and the 
assignment of sub-tasks to roles should be tracked to and 
from the roles and relationships for auditing purposes. In 
addition further work is needed on checking consistency 
of policy specifications and to determine what actions are 
performed when an event is triggered. This will form part 
of a role and policy specification toolset. 
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